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The Swiss reorganization law[1] does not meet the
demands of a modern reorganization law in many re-
spects. A radical reform is overdue[2].  It is today largely
approved that reorganization proceedings under judi-
cial protection are initiated too late. As a consequence,
business operations collapse. One of the main goals of
a future reformation has therefore to be the mainte-
nance of business operations. Below, some basic con-
siderations about these goals and – to begin with – 
the legal purpose of reorganization law are taken into
account.*
Hans Caspar von der Crone, Bettina Kopta-Stutz, Loïc Pfister
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Swiss Reorganization Law
Going Concern and Corporate Governance
1. Legal Purpose
Looking into the reorganization law in-
duces us, first of all, to question wheth-
er the policy of law demands a reor-
ganization law and, if so, what its legal
purpose should be. The main issue of
these considerations is whether a com-
pany’s bankruptcy and liquidation – as
a painful, but inevitable consequence
of the market-based mechanism – or its
reorganization is the more reasonable
solution in terms of economic and so-
cial policy. In order to discuss this issue
it is necessary to contemplate it from
two different points of view [3]:
On the one hand, bankruptcy is the
legal enforcement measure by which
unprofitable companies are liquidated,
thus freeing the economy from these
harmful elements [4]. In doing so, bank-
ruptcy serves the efficient allocation of
resources in the economy. The alloca-
tion function ensures that the resources
of the economy are allocated to compa-
nies that make the best use of them [5].
Furthermore, bankruptcy not only as-
sumes the liability, but also has, through
threat of sanction, a preventive influ-
ence on debtor’s behavior before bank-
ruptcy [6]. This legal enforcement should
strengthen the creditors’ expectations
that the debtor would meet its obliga-
tions. Thus, it offers an incentive for the
creditors to give (more) credit [7]. From
this point of view, a «debtor-friendly»
reorganization law can provide incen-
tives that adversely affect the economy.
On the other hand, a company’s bank-
ruptcy and liquidation normally causes
high costs to the economy. The transi-
tion from a running company to mere
assets typically involves a substantial
loss of value [8]. Moreover, employees,
suppliers, and customers depend on the
company for their subsistence or finan-
cial prosperity. They all stand to suffer
from the collapse of the company [9].
These additional losses to the economy
have to be taken into account in order
to attain allocative efficiency. Liquida-
tion does not always result in efficient
allocation of resources. In fact, a more
efficient allocation of resources can be
in some cases achieved by reorganizing
the company [10].
Concerning the prevention of frivolous
running into debt, it is important to no-
tice that threat of bankruptcy often fails
to have its intended preventive effect.
The preventive effect is based on the as-
sumption that those who manage the
company are also the company’s own-
ers [11]. Indeed, there are many sole
proprietorships in the Swiss economy.
However, most of the major enterprises
with a large damage potential are incor-
porated companies [12]. In all these
companies, ownership and management
are separated with the consequence
that bankruptcy all too often affects in-
nocent people [13]. Moreover, it must
be pointed out that economic progress
depends on the willingness to take ex-
tended risks [14].
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In our opinion, the reasons backing the
need of a reorganization law prevail.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of a
progressive legal system to offer finan-
cially distressed companies an up-to-
date reorganization procedure as a real
alternative to bankruptcy. In doing so,
the legal purpose should not be to avoid
bankruptcy at any price, but to achieve
a «symbiosis» between reorganization
and bankruptcy [15]. Each individual
case should be analyzed as to whether
reorganizing the company makes sense
from an economic point of view. At
the same time, the reorganization pro-
cedure has to be implemented in such
a manner that the going concern is
kept [16].
2. Going Concern
2.1 Current Law
Under the current Swiss reorganization
law, the board of directors of a company
is de facto not able to file for bank-
ruptcy until the company’s liabilities
exceed its assets [17]. But by that time,
a company is normally no longer finan-
cially able to continue its business [18].
Maintaining the ability to remain in
business requires earlier initiation of
reorganization proceedings [19]. Reor-
ganization proceedings should be ini-
tiated at a time when there are still
enough equity capital and liquid assets
to maintain the business operations.
2.2 Early Warning System
For this purpose, the current trigger
mechanism that the company’s liabili-
ties have to exceed its assets, should be
complemented by an early warning sys-
tem based on equity ratio and liquidity
ratios. Liquidity squeezes are critical
for the going concern: When the ability
to pay in the foreseeable future is not
guaranteed, the going concern is com-
promised as well [20]. Furthermore, in
every commercial activity an adequate
amount of equity capital is needed to be
able to provide the company with the
necessary working funds and to cover
loss [21]. Therefore, liquidity ratios and
an equity ratio are suitable indicators
for a financial crisis in any company [22].
Moreover, for every commercial activ-
ity there are empirical ratios concerning
both indicators, which can be consult-
ed [23].
In view of companies’ diverse econo-
mic circumstances and their fluctuating
need for liquidity and equity capital
depending on the sector and the stage of
development, concrete legislative regu-
lation is not appropriate [24]. Instead,
for flexibility, companies decide them-
selves on the adequate ratios suitable for
their business. To maintain transparen-
cy, they should write them in the articles
of corporation. In doing so, it is up to
the shareholders to decide whether to
establish such a system [25]. This option
is justified by the fact that an early
warning system can have momentous
consequences on the future of the com-
pany, and thus on the shareholders’ in-
terests. The system allows the board of
directors to file for reorganization pro-
ceedings with direct consequences on
the shareholders’ interests before the
company’s liabilities exceed its assets.
Considering this fact, even the credi-
tors’ interests do not justify the legal
duty to establish an early warning sys-
tem. Furthermore, it should be taken
into account that the institution of such
a system is in the interest of the share-
holders as well. The owners acquire an
additional instrument for monitoring
the management’s performance. This
allows them to exercise their member-
ship rights earlier than today in an emer-
gency.
Assuming the shareholders have decid-
ed to establish an early warning system,
the board of directors is the body quali-
fied to select and determine in detail
the expedient liquidity and equity ratios
in the company’s articles of corporation.
It has, due to its duties, the required
know-how as well as the specific know-
ledge of the company and its line of
business [26].
The proposition given above may be
outlined by the following: The statutory
power is conferred at the shareholders’
meeting to enable the board of direc-
tors to write down the suitable liquidity
and equity ratios in the company’s ar-
ticles of corporation. In doing so, the
board of directors is responsible for the
appropriate selection of the ratios, tak-
ing into consideration the specific eco-
nomic circumstance of the company
and its line of business.
2.3 Initiation of 
Reorganization Proceedings
As mentioned above, an early warning
system can form a trigger mechanism to
file for reorganization proceedings in
good time. However, there is no incen-
tive for the board of directors to file for
reorganization proceedings [27]. There-
fore, the board of directors should 
be legally obligated to take care of the
going concern. It must take action at
the very moment when the require-
ments for the continuation of business,
i. e. equity capital and liquidity, will not
be met in the foreseeable future [28].
As a consequence, the board of direc-
tors has to be able to file for reorgani-
zation proceedings under judicial pro-
tection at the time when the going con-
cern is no longer guaranteed in the
foreseeable future [29]. The court must
have the power to grant the petition for
reorganization proceedings as soon as
the board of directors substantiates by
prima facie evidence that the going
concern is compromised in the short to
middle term. The opening of reorgani-
zation proceedings does not require the
company’s liabilities exceed its assets.
Moreover, the company does not have
to be insolvent.
According to the current law, the in-
junction that stops foreclosure, garnish-
Bettina Kopta-Stutz, lic. iur., research 
fellow in the project «Corporate Gover-
nance and Reorganization of Companies»
led by Professor Hans Caspar von der
Crone, currently visiting scholar at Yale
Law School, New Haven/USA
Der Schweizer Treuhänder 12/05 1029
RECHT
Hans Caspar von der Crone, Bettina Kopta-Stutz, Loïc Pfister, Some Theses Concerning Modern Swiss Reorganization Law
Der Schweizer Treuhänder 12/051030
RECHT
Hans Caspar von der Crone, Bettina Kopta-Stutz, Loïc Pfister, Some Theses Concerning Modern Swiss Reorganization Law
ments, and collection activity against the
debtor does not automatically go into
effect when the petition is filed [30]. The
injunction, also called stay, has to be
granted by the court. This procedure
can take several days. During this pe-
riod of time the debtor is generally not
able to keep his business alive, at least
in lines of business which need many
liquid funds. The reason for this is that
the filing for reorganization proceedings
publicizes the financial distress of the
company. This publicity typically cau-
ses additional cash flow problems [31].
In order to remove this risk for the going
concern, the stay of creditor actions
against the debtor should automatically
be effective at the moment the petition
is filed [32].
3. Corporate Governance in
Reorganization Proceedings
Good corporate governance is a decid-
ing factor for successful reorganization
proceedings [33]. What legislation can
and should provide to ensure good cor-
porate governance in reorganization
proceedings, is the subject of this sec-
tion.
3.1 Decision-Makers
In a corporation, fundamental decisions
are made by the shareholders [34].
Transferring the decision-making power
from the shareholders to the creditors
is not justified as long as the corporation
is solvent and has no excess of liabilities
over assets. Therefore, if the reorgani-
zation proceedings are instituted while
the company still has liquid funds and
equity capital disposable, the sharehold-
ers have to participate in the corpora-
tion’s decision-making process during
reorganization proceedings. Sharehold-
ers and creditors have to make funda-
mental decisions such as voting on the
reorganization plan [35].
As a consequence, there are two cate-
gories of decision-makers within a mod-
ern reorganization procedure [36]. The
shareholders could be involved in the
decision-making process by judicial ar-
rangement: The court allocates share-
holders and creditors to groups with si-
milar interests [37]. Within these groups,
they vote on the plan and other relevant
matters.
3.2 Corporate Management
3.2.1 Management’s Duties
In reorganization proceedings, much
more than in any other situation, the
qualified and coherent conduct of bu-
siness is a question of survival [38]. The
management has the required know-
how and experience as well as the spe-
cific knowledge of the company, its col-
laborators, its sector of activities, and its
stage of development. Therefore, the
present management should remain in
charge of the conduct of business during
reorganization proceedings [39]. How-
ever, in some cases total or partial re-
placement of the management body is
needed in order to avoid keeping detri-
mental conduct of business. In other
cases the engagement of persons with
experience in reorganization or other
experts can be recommended [40]. In
these cases, it is a moot point how and
especially by whom these persons should
be appointed or dismissed [41].
On this matter, we have to distinguish
between appointment or dismissal of
members to the board of directors and
members to the executive management.
Concerning the board of directors, every
creditor and shareholder as well as the
trustee [42] should have the right to re-
quest the appointment or the dismissal
of members of this body. Since appro-
priate management is of such impor-
tance for the success of reorganization,
the trustee and all parties in interest
should be able to raise a motion at any
time prior to the confirmation of the
reorganization plan. The power to ap-
point or dismiss should be given to the
court. The competence of the court can
guarantee efficient proceedings as well
as the neutrality of the decision, which
helps its acceptance. For practical rea-
sons, the trustee nominates some eligi-
ble persons for election. Moreover, the
right of nomination should be accorded
every creditor and shareholder.
Concerning the executive management
the board of directors should have the
statutory power to elect and dismiss
these members during reorganization
proceedings [43]. In doing so, the exclu-
sive power makes the board’s sphere of
responsibility coincide with its sphere
of influence [44].
3.2.2 Role of Trustee
The rapidity and quality of decision-
making is essential in the reorganization
of a company. Efficient continuation of
business requires a clear separation of
the powers assigned to the management
and the trustee. The court should assign
neither strategic nor executive functions
to the trustee [45]. The exclusive power
to conduct business has to be assigned to
the management. This exclusive power
avoids negative redundancy in the deci-
sion-making process and ensures con-
duct in the general interest [46]. Fur-
thermore, it draws a clear dividing line
between the sphere of responsibility of
the management and the trustee [47].
The trustee is responsible for super-
vising the management in general and
monitoring the compliance of the man-
agement with the plan of reorganiza-
tion and with the law [48]. Due to this
crucial function the trustee should be
independent and therefore, not be in-
volved in management. In a situation in
which many creditors are disappointed
in their expectations, the aspect of inde-
pendence should not be neglected [49].
However, the independence is not en-
dangered when the trustee cooperates
with the board of directors in the pre-
paration of the reorganization plan. On
the contrary, it is a good opportunity to
Loïc Pfister, lic. jur., research fellow in
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present the concerns of the creditors
early in the process and to prevent un-
necessary loss of time.
3.3 Excursus: 
Competence of the Court
The reorganization procedure runs
under judicial protection. In order to im-
plement a balance of interests between
creditors and shareholders, the powers
of the court should be extended. Par-
ticularly, it must have the power to
confirm a reorganization plan notwith-
standing the vote of the creditors and
the shareholders, if the plan is fair,
represents the best solution for the par-
ties in interest, and its accomplishment
seems to be likely [50].
A reorganization procedure makes high
demands on the court. It has to decide
on legal as well as economic matters
competently and quickly. Since such
procedures are rare, the competent
courts often do not have the required
knowledge. Therefore, the competence
to administrate these procedures should
be given to a few courts in order to im-
plement the modern reorganization law
in an optimal way [51].
4. Financing of Going Concern
For successful reorganization, it is essen-
tial that legislation makes it easier for
companies to procure the working funds
required for the going concern [52].
However, current Swiss legislation does
not comply with this demand. Accord-
ing to the Swiss Debt Enforcement and
Bankruptcy Act, the court is entitled to
confirm the reorganization plan only if
the statutory requirements are fulfilled.
One of these requirements is as fol-
lows [53]: The performance of the re-
organization plan, the complete settle-
ment of the privileged claims, as well as
the obligations contract during the stay
with the approval of the trustee must be
sufficiently secured. In most cases they
are secured by cash deposit or by means
of a bank guarantee [54]. As a result of
these security rights, urgently needed
working funds are pledged and no lon-
ger available for reorganization of the
company. That can strongly compromise
the success of reorganization. However,
the interest in successful reorganization
should prevail over the indemnity of the
creditors. For this reason, the provision
of security should be abolished [55]. The
court should be able to confirm a re-
organization plan if the plan is likely to
be accomplished during the scheduled
time [56]. In addition, the complete sett-
lement of the privileged claims as well
as the obligations contract during the
stay must also seem likely. Thus, essen-
tial working funds would be available
for reorganization.
5. Conclusion
Modern reorganization law has to meet
different interests, and at the same time
be practicable and efficient. In view of
these requirements, the postulated re-
form of the Swiss reorganization law is
a great challenge which nevertheless re-
quires our every endeavor. Successful
reorganization proceedings are not only
in the interest of companies, sharehold-
ers and employees, but also in the inter-
est of creditors and the public. Thus, the
reform would contribute to greater ac-
ceptance of the economic system.
Notes
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7 See Milgrom/Roberts, p. 183 seq.
8 See Bernhard König, p. 4; Siegwart/Caytas/
Mahari, p. 132; Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/
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p. 450 seqq. and Karsten Schmidt, p. 4. An ef-
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provisions; see von der Crone/Beyeler/Dé-
deyan, p. 470 seq.
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reasonable and efficient to immediately liqui-
date the company. First, the management
should be replaced. Cf. Axel Flessner, who
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zation and liquidation is only a question of ex-
tent (Axel Flessner, p. 180).
11 See Axel Flessner, p. 177 seq.
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see Siegwart/Caytas/Mahari, p. 183.
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ulated by article 725 para. 2 CO. According to
the current law a debtor can file for composi-
tion proceedings at any time (see article 293
para. 1 DEBA in conjunction with article 295
para. 1 DEBA). But, the court is not able to
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30 See article 293 para. 3 DEBA and article 295
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33 The «Cadbury Report» refers to corporate go-
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34 See Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/Nobel, § 20
note 3, note 11.
35 Cf. the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under which
the shareholders participate in the decision-
making process (11 USC §1126, 11 USC
§501). Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a
company may file a voluntary bankruptcy pe-
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Leif M. Clark, p. 1.
36 Whereas, the current law provides only one
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the commencement of reorganization pro-
ceedings it is up to the shareholders to decide,
after that, up to the creditors (cf. article 305
DEBA).
37 Cf. the similar procedure during reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy
Code, 11 USC §1122. See the critics in the Ex-
pertenbericht, p. 30 seq.
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members of the executive management ac-
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law.
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executive management.
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quired know-how and experience in the field
of business of the company. The trustee al-
ways has a handicap compared with the man-
agement, and is hardly able to effectively di-
rect the management. Furthermore, the
trustee is caught between protection of inter-
ests of the company and the creditors. Con-
cerning the effects of exclusive power to con-
duct business assigned to the management see
Hans Caspar von der Crone, Strategische
Leitung und Qualitätssicherung, p. 1 and con-
cerning the required knowledge, p. 7.
47 In doing so, the exclusive power makes the
management’s sphere of responsibility coin-
cide with its sphere of influence. See the ref-
erence in footnote 46.
48 Cf. article 295 para. 2 subsec. a DEBA, article
298 para. 1 sentence 1 DEBA.
49 See Karl Wüthrich, p. 6. This is especially im-
portant regarding the trustee’s investigation
into whether or not the management can be
made responsible. The independent perfor-
mance of this investigation is hardly feasible
if the trustee cooperates with the manage-
ment.
50 Whereas the Swiss reorganization law in force
requires that at least one-third in number of
the creditors which hold at least three-quarter
in amount of the allowed claims has to con-
sent to reorganization plan so that the court is
entitled to confirm the plan (cf. article 305
DEBA). See the similar provision according
to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
11 USC §1129(b) and Meier/Peyer/ Rutsch-
mann, p. 15.
51 The same opinion is represented, for example,
by Isaak Meier, Chapter 11, p. 463 and Markus
L. Schmid, p. 65.
52 This becomes even more important as the
adverse publicity created by the company’s
financial crisis typically causes additional
liquidity requirements; see Lukas Glanzmann
p. 55.
53 Cf. article 306 para. 2 subsec. 2 DEBA. It is
often difficult for a company to fulfill this re-
quirement; see Amonn/Walther, § 54 note 77.
54 Cf. Expertenbericht, p. 29. See Hans-Ulrich
Hardmeier, p. 23 footnote 111.
55 See Meier/Peyer/Rutschmann, p. 15; Andreas
Feuz, p. 22; Lutz Häussermann, p. 213.
56 Cf. the similar provision according to Chapter
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC
§1129(a)(11).
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